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We live in a time of crises. Several advanced economies face the severe thread of bankruptcy; 
whole populations in Africa and the Middle East loose the basis for their lives in their fight for 
democracy; and environmental threads, like Fukushima or CO2 emissions, endanger other 
countries. All these crises lead to large-scale cooperation across nations. Europe offers credit 
to financially save their struggling partners; the US military supports the fight against dictators 
and the whole world almost instantly sent technical equipment and manpower to Japan after 
the first plant in Fukushima exploded. This result is surprising as experimental work on 
cooperation of the last decades confirms one central fact: Although strangers initially 
contribute to a high extend, voluntary support for others decreases over time [12, 29]. While 
varying in height across different cultures, this effect can be found worldwide [3]. Between the 
examples above and the experimental studies one central difference exists. In experiments 
participants distribute money they received as “present” from the experimenter, while 
voluntary contribution among the described nations is a direct response to the losses different 
humans faced. Therefore, one central question emerges: What are the characteristics of 
cooperation in the loss case? 
 
Biologists, psychologists and economists have intensively studied cooperation under gains. 
Different motivations for cooperation exist [20]. Kin selection [1, 23], i.e. close relatedness 
between different individuals, fosters cooperation. This motive only explains cooperation 
among relatives. Reciprocity [21, 22], i.e. cooperation with others who cooperated before, 
circumvents this restriction and allows for cooperation among strangers. Finally, group 
selection [13], i.e. selecting interaction partners, ensures cooperation as cooperative 
individuals join other cooperative individuals who in consequence do not decrease their 
cooperation levels. Aside these justifications for cooperation, altruistic punishment ensures 
cooperative behavior among participants [1, 4, 14]. Here, participants use part of their 
earnings to reduce the payoff of other group members. Although the cultural background of 
participants strongly influences punishment behavior [5, 14], several basic properties do not 
differ across different subject pools: with the use of punishment the degree of cooperation 
remains stable; participants use anti-social punishment, i.e. a fraction of participants punishes 
others although being more cooperative then themselves; punishers accept the costs for 
punishment often resulting in lower overall payoffs than in experiments without punishment. 
Surprisingly, even informal punishment, i.e. stating disapproval with the behavior of others 
instead of direct monetary sanctions, ensures high degrees of cooperation [19]. Is the 
punishment mechanism extended by a reputation mechanism, the degree of cooperation 
increases even further [24]. In sum, punishment is the preferred mechanism to ensure 
cooperation – even among strangers. Even participants having the chance to choose between 
an institution with punishment and an institution without punishment prefer the punishment 
institution [11, 26]. In addition punishment does not crowd out voluntary cooperation: If 











participants first cooperate in a scenario with punishment before acting in a scenario without, 
they show exactly the same behavior as when not having faced the punishment scenario before 
– at least when participants play under gains and punishment is perceived as fair [7]. 
 
Public Good Games are a prominent approach to analyze punishment, cooperation and 
reciprocity. In one popular version of the Public Good Game [3], participants interact in 
groups of four for ten periods. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens each 
period. Then the participants choose how many tokens they want to contribute to a joint 
project and how many tokens to keep for them. For each token kept, a participant receives 1 
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), while all members of the group receive 0.4 ECU per 
token contributed. In groups where all participants keep all tokens for themselves, the payoff 
per participant is 20 ECU. If all participants contribute everything into the group project, the 
overall payoff per participant is 32 (= 0.4x20x4) ECU. Hence, each participant can choose to 
earn 20 ECU without any risk, while they can earn up to 32 ECU by risking to be exploited by 
the other group members. 
 
In experiments, one typically adds punishment to the Public Good Game by displaying the 
contributions of all other group members after the distribution decision. Participants can than 
assign up to 10 deduction points to each other group member depending on their contributions. 
Per assigned deduction point the punishing participant pays one 1 ECU, while the punished 
participant looses 3 ECU.  
 
Figure 1: Impact of equivalent changes in earnings on utility under gains and losses. According to prospect theory, which is widely accepted 
among behavioral economists, methods transferring monetary payoffs in utility have two central properties: (1) Utility functions are s-shaped 
and individuals value losses higher than gains. In cooperative situations the shape of a utility function has a severe impact on the decision 
situation. If a certain fraction of the payoff is fixed and a variable part is added, the variable part has only minor impact on utility. This is 
visualized in the right part of this figure. Doubling earnings (∆x) leads to a small increase in utility (∆y1). If individuals faced a loss before 
their decision, the impact of the fixed payoff is small, while the same increase in payoffs (∆x) leads to a drastic increase of utility (∆y2) 
 
In Public Good experiments without punishment one typically observes mediocre 
contributions to the public good in the first periods, which decrease over time. Almost all 
participants choose to play the riskless strategy in the end of the experiment. While in 
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treatments with punishment participants tend to resort to the risky strategy throughout the 
experiment.  
 
During the last years, prospect theory [17, 18, 28, 15, 16] is often used to explain human 
behavior. According to this theory utility functions are s-shaped and individuals value losses 
higher than gains (see Figure 1). The additional utility (∆y1) participants receive if all 
participants cooperate, compared to groups without any contributions are small in the gain 
case. Namely, if all participants can guarantee earnings of 20 ECU by egoistic behavior, their 
increase in utility is small if all increase their earnings to 32 ECU by contributing everything. 
The situation changes, if participants act under losses. E.g., if all participants receive a loss of 
32 ECU in the beginning of each period, they can reach earnings of 0 ECU per period by 
showing full cooperation, while they receive -10 ECU when being uncooperative. The impact 
of the same difference in earnings (∆x) is big, when calculating the utility change (∆y2) of a 
participant. Given this observation, changes in mediocre levels of contribution have a stronger 
impact on utility when analyzing losses, than when analyzing gains. Participants have to 
cooperate much more to reach the same levels of utility under losses, than they have to under 
gains. Therefore, effects of emotions [3] or reciprocity [20] should be much clearer to observe 
than in experiments with gains.  
 
Table 1: Frequency and average height of social and anti-social punishment per group: This table gathers information concerning punishment 
in both session types. As Social Punishment, we summarize all situations, in which the current participant contributed more than the group 
member he might punish. Anti-Social Punishment stands for all other situation, i.e. when the other group member contributed more or the 
same amount as the current participant. The column ‘#’ indicates the number of occurrences of corresponding situations, ‘Freq.’ stands for the 
proportion of punishments divided by the value in ‘#’. The column ‘Avg.’ finally specifies the average amount of ECU a participant invested 
in punishment of other group members. Notice, that in three groups (5, 8, 11) of the NP_PU sessions no participant ever deviated from full 
contribution. Hence, no participant of these groups could ever punish socially. 
	  
Social	  Punishment	   Anti-­‐Social	  Punishment	   All	  Punishment	  
Grp.	  
NP_PU	   PU_NP	   NP_PU	   PU_NP	   NP_PU	   PU_NP	  
#	   Freq.	   Avg.	   #	   Freq.	   Avg.	   #	   Freq.	   Avg.	   #	   Freq.	   Avg.	   Freq.	   Avg.	   Freq.	   Avg.	  
1	   12	   66.7%	   0.67	   29	   89.7%	   0.90	   108	   15.7%	   0.16	   91	   7.7%	   0.08	   20.8%	   -­‐0.34	   27.5%	   -­‐1.38	  
2	   12	   91.7%	   0.92	   34	   64.7%	   0.65	   108	   0.0%	   0.00	   86	   7.0%	   0.07	   9.2%	   -­‐0.28	   23.3%	   -­‐1.06	  
3	   15	   100.0%	   1.00	   29	   75.9%	   0.76	   105	   0.0%	   0.00	   91	   2.2%	   0.02	   12.5%	   -­‐0.54	   20.0%	   -­‐0.67	  
4	   9	   88.9%	   0.89	   59	   71.2%	   0.71	   111	   6.3%	   0.06	   61	   9.8%	   0.10	   12.5%	   -­‐0.21	   40.0%	   -­‐1.25	  
5	   0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   46	   76.1%	   0.76	   120	   0.0%	   0.00	   74	   16.2%	   0.16	   0.0%	   0.00	   39.2%	   -­‐1.98	  
6	   6	   100.0%	   1.00	   57	   57.9%	   0.58	   114	   0.0%	   0.00	   63	   9.5%	   0.10	   5.0%	   -­‐0.15	   32.5%	   -­‐1.68	  
7	   44	   15.9%	   0.16	   18	   77.8%	   0.78	   76	   2.6%	   0.03	   102	   2.0%	   0.02	   7.5%	   -­‐0.13	   13.3%	   -­‐0.28	  
8	   0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   3	   66.7%	   0.67	   120	   2.5%	   0.03	   117	   3.4%	   0.03	   2.5%	   -­‐0.03	   5.0%	   -­‐0.09	  
9	   23	   82.6%	   0.83	   12	   100.0%	   1.00	   97	   6.2%	   0.06	   108	   2.8%	   0.03	   20.8%	   -­‐0.77	   12.5%	   -­‐0.25	  
10	   35	   57.1%	   0.57	   6	   66.7%	   0.67	   85	   12.9%	   0.13	   114	   0.0%	   0.00	   25.8%	   -­‐0.84	   3.3%	   -­‐0.21	  
11	   0	   -­‐	   -­‐	   32	   62.5%	   0.63	   120	   0.8%	   0.01	   88	   2.3%	   0.02	   0.8%	   -­‐0.01	   18.3%	   -­‐0.38	  
12	   18	   83.3%	   0.83	   49	   85.7%	   0.86	   102	   18.6%	   0.19	   71	   49.3%	   0.49	   28.3%	   -­‐0.82	   64.2%	   -­‐3.78	  
All	   174	   62.6%	   -­‐1.97	   374	   73.3%	   -­‐2.97	   1266	   5.2%	   -­‐0.12	   1066	   8.0%	   -­‐0.42	   12.2%	   -­‐0.34	   24.9%	   -­‐1.08	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Experimental Results We report the results of an experiment on public goods with losses. 
The experiment is identical to the experiment introduced by Fehr [3], except for a loss all 
participants received in each period at the height of the maximum earnings the participants 
could reach under full cooperation, namely at height 32 and the payoff mechanism. We paid 
all participants 14 days in advance, to ensure they used the money as it was their own [25]. We 
conducted our experiments at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and compare our results 
with results from a public good experiment conducted in Bonn during an intercultural study 
[14]. We first give an overview of the punishment behavior observed, before we analyze the 
contributions of the participants and their payoffs. As participants changed their behavior 
between both session types, we put our focus on the differences between session types. 
 
Punishment: According to existing analyses of public good games (see e.g. [4, 3, 14]) public 
good experiments with and without punishment should not show any order effects. Therefore, 
we analyze punishment behavior in the Public Loss Game with a focus on order (see Table 1). 
An analysis of punishment behavior shows that participants in first playing in a treatment 
without punishment and in a treatment with punishment afterwards (NP_PU sessions) punish 
less (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.046, Z = -1.994, W = 115.5, U = 37.5) and face 
lower punishment costs (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.026, Z = -2.223, W = 111.5, U = 
33.5) than participants who play the other sequence of treatments (in PU_NP sessions). When 
analyzing Social Punishment, i.e. punishment of less cooperative group members, and Anti 
Social Punishment, i.e. punishment of equally or more cooperative group members, we neither 
see this effect in the frequency (Social Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.393, Z 
= -0.855, W = 120.0, U = 42.0; Anti Social Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 
0.297, Z = -1.044, W = 132, U = 54) nor the height (Social Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, 
two-tailed, p = 0.594, Z = -0.533, W = 124.5, U = 46.5; Anti Social Punishment: Mann-
Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.117, Z = -1.566, W = 123, U = 45) of punishment. Therefore, we 
calculate the difference between own contribution and the contribution of a group member and 
bin punishment accordingly. Hence, we split Social Punishment into the intervals [-20,-11] 
and [-10,-1], while we split Anti-Social Punishment into [0], [1,10] and [11,20] (see Figure 2). 
Using this grouping, we find differences in the frequency and height of punishment for the 
interval [-20,-11] (Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, one-tailed, p = 0.040, Z = -1.873, W = 92, U = 26, 
Avg.: Mann-Whitney U, one-tailed, p = 0.040, Z = -1.787, W = 92, U = 26). All other 
intervals show no significant differences ([-10,-1] Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 
0.879, Z = -0.153, W = 92.5, U = 47.5; Avg. Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.196, Z = -
1.292, W = 98.5, U = 32.5; [0] Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.887, Z = -0.189, W 
= 147, U = 69; Avg.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.950, Z = -0.063, W = 149, U = 71; 
[1,10] Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.776, Z = -0.284, W = 91, U = 46; Avg.: 
Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.626, Z = -0.487, W = 109.5, U = 43.5; [11,20] Freq.: 
Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.542, Z = -0.609, W = 87, U = 42; Mann-Whitney U, two-
tailed, p = 0.239, Z = -1.177, W = 101, U = 35). To sum up, significant differences in 
punishment behavior between both session types exist. Namely, both frequency of punishment 
and average height of punishment are higher in the punishment treatment of PU_NP sessions 
 KIT Working Paper Series in Economics6than in the punishment treatment of NP_PUsessi s. We attribute this r sul  to a harsher line of action agai st t o g unsocial behavior in PU_NP sessions than in NP_PU sessions.(a) He ght of punishment costsb R lative freq ncy of punishmentFigur2: Heigh  and fr quency of punishment by relative c ntributi n: This figure illustrates the height (a) and frequency (b) of pun shment ep ated by the difference betwee  a p r i ip ts contribution a d the contribution of th  corr sp din  group me b r. E.g., the int rval [- 0,11] dic s that  articipants con ribution lib tw 11 and 20 token  hig er th n the ontribution of th  group member and the interval [0] at er  all c s  w t  qual ntr butions.in ly,w  inv ate t d v lo m n  f pun shment over time (segure 3). As he fi urll t s nish t co ts rela vely stabl  hr ug ou  the experiment, whit ys t la t p r of h NP_PU sess oWil ox n Sig d R kT st–9x P 1> P 9, 1x Pe od 10 < Peri d 9, 2x Peri d 10 = P riod, p = 0.017, Z =.397Pun s me c f t PU_NP ess ns d ot incre s in the l st p rid (n Sig  R k T t > P r d 9, 2x P r od 10 < eriod 9, 1x P r od 10 = Pe iod =0 141, Z = 47S s o N uni hm  uni hmePNo e tD l p e  f v e d ct o c ts per par icipan  w h 95% confidence i tervalT e te  l n s sh w  av r e s s for p t p r s ssio  y . Th li e ou  o sta d for th 95% confidence in ervals of the c rr sponding datao ts. Whil  t co tr m in s l ro h u  h  x i e , costs i cr a  i  he last p i d. 
-­‐2.5	  0100.0	  1	  23456789 	  642 NP_PU	  PU NP[-­‐ ,-­‐1]	  1]	  ],10]	  1,20]	  %	  %	  5071 %	  [-­‐ ,-­‐ ]	  [-­‐2 ,-­‐ 1]	  [0]	  [ ,10]	  1 20 	  NP_PU	  PU NP
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Contributions: After we have shown, that punishment behavior is significantly different in 
NP_PU sessions and PU_NP sessions, we now investigate the contributions of the participants 
(see Table 2). Both treatments, i.e. Treatment No Punishment (Mann-Whitney U, one-tailed, p 
= 0.039, Z = -1.790, W = 119, U = 41) and Treatment Punishment (Mann-Whitney U, one-
tailed, p = 0.049, Z = -1.965, W = 116, U = 38), have higher contributions in the NP_PU 
sessions, than in the PU_NP sessions. 
 
When investigating the temporal development of contributions over time (see Figure 4), we 
only find end game behavior in the punishment treatment of the PU_NP sessions (Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test – 2x Period 10 > Period 9, 8x Period 10 < Period 9, 2x Period 10 = Period 9, 
p = 0.016, Z = -2.41), while we find no end game behavior in any other treatment (NP_PU, 
Punishment: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 3x Period 10 > Period 9, 9x Period 10 < Period 9, 
3x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 0.120, Z = -1.554; NP_PU, No Punishment: Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test – 4x Period 10 > Period 9, 4x Period 10 < Period 9, 4x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 
0.944, Z = -0.070; PU_NP, No Punishment: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 3x Period 10 > 
Period 9, 6x Period 10 < Period 9, 3x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 0.192, Z = -1.304). Notice in 
both punishment treatments participants show end game behavior. While in sessions NP_PU 
such end game behavior is characterized by an increase of punishment in the last period, it 
results in decreased contributions in sessions PU_NP. For both treatments without 
punishment, we do not observe such behavior. 
 
Table 2: Average contribution and standard deviation of contributions per group: This table shows the average contribution per group and 
treatment and the standard deviation of the contributions. As already mentioned when describing punishment behavior, the average 
contribution in three groups (5, 8, 11) of Treatment Punishment in NP_PU sessions is 20. Aside this, contributions are higher in NP_PU 
sessions than in PU_NP sessions. 
Group	  
Punishment	   No	  Punishment	  
NP_PU	   PU_NP	   NP_PU	   PU_NP	  
Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	  
1	   19.43	   2.23	   17.15	   6.17	   5.43	   6.20	   1.75	   4.63	  
2	   18.43	   5.33	   15.65	   7.13	   6.88	   9.38	   7.63	   8.95	  
3	   17.98	   6.07	   17.20	   5.41	   7.18	   7.43	   7.33	   8.78	  
4	   19.55	   2.04	   8.48	   6.54	   7.90	   7.87	   0.45	   1.36	  
5	   20.00	   0.00	   12.80	   8.49	   18.63	   4.93	   3.88	   7.30	  
6	   19.43	   3.19	   10.68	   5.94	   9.25	   6.85	   12.93	   7.07	  
7	   14.50	   5.97	   18.68	   4.08	   5.25	   7.16	   2.68	   5.22	  
8	   20.00	   0.00	   19.75	   1.58	   16.60	   7.12	   7.23	   8.99	  
9	   15.98	   8.09	   18.88	   3.84	   5.15	   8.51	   7.53	   7.10	  
10	   18.10	   3.97	   19.13	   3.90	   7.60	   7.00	   5.00	   8.77	  
11	   20.00	   0.00	   18.58	   3.66	   5.60	   8.49	   4.98	   6.04	  
12	   17.63	   5.80	   8.30	   7.39	   4.08	   6.84	   3.28	   5.04	  
All	   18.42	   -­‐	   15.44	   -­‐	   8.30	   -­‐	   5.39	   -­‐	  
 
Analyzing contributions in the first period shows significant differences between NP_PU and 
PU_NP sessions in the treatments without punishment (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 
0.033, Z = -2.135, W = 2054, U = 878). These differences are not visible in the first period of 
 KIT Working Paper Series in Economics8the punishment treatment (Mann-Whitney U, twoailed, p = 0.189, Z = 1.315 W = 2173.5, U = 997.5). In add tion, in NP_PU sessions the contribution in the first period of the No Punishment tr atment determi es both the average contribution in the whole No Punishmentreatm nts (A va p = 0.026, F = 6.823) and the subseque t Pu ishm n reat nt (Anova, p 0.047, F = 5.138). Th s is different for the PU_NP sess . Here, contributions are a goodpr dictor for the pu is tr atment (Anova, p = 0.001, F = 23.220), while o correlati nb twe  con ibut o s i  the fi s per od o the P nishm t Treatm  and No Puni hmentT atment exists (A va, p = 0.876, F = 0.026).h  resul s concer i g contributions are esp cially i er ng, when compar d t exp imentsw h ga . T h ig t f ooper io  in ex erim ntsv r gai li bellow he lower bound of5% c f d ce interval of he ght of coope ation n t Punis m nt Treatmen  iNP_PU e si . c ord gly pper b und f rr sp d g 95% confid nce interv  in o u ishm t Tr a ts i  th  PU_Ns s li s m s  per d  bell w the eig t fcoo ration he reat e ts wi h ut p i m nt ove  ga ns.( ) it out pu i ntb  un hm tSessi n No P shme t unish entcd–  Pu i h entFig r  4: Devel  f av ag  o tr but o s p r par ic pa  wi  95% onfidence interval: These f gures sh  he d vel pment of av ge co ribu ion  v r t m (d d l es). cc rdi g to x ing i v stiga o s, i  tre ents wit  pu hm nt ((b) d (c)) co r bu ionsend to b s a le v  m , hile th y creas in tr me ts w tho  puni hm  ((a) an  (d)). In contrast to existi g i vesti at ,95%o f  i tervals (lin w us f th tre mt t NP_PU s s ions tend to b na ow  than e or s ndi gc f d ce rv l of th PU_NP s s io . In a i i i  i NP_PU essions are higher than in PU_ P s ssi s f br a m ts.
0	  510	  521234678910	  Height	  of	  contribtuion	  Peri d	  	  	   Period	  u"i 	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Income: Both punishment costs are higher in PU_NP sessions than in NP_PU sessions, while 
at the same time contributions in PU_NP sessions are lower than in NP_PU sessions. This 
results in clear differences between the incomes of a participant in a PU_NP session and in a 
NP_PU session (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Average income and standard deviation of income per group: This table shows both the average income and the standard deviation of 
incomes per group. While for NP_PU sessions the income on average is higher in the punishment treatment, it is not for the PU_NP sessions. 
Group	  







Punishment	  –	  No	  
Punishment	  
Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	   Avg.	   S.D.	  
1	   -­‐4.45	   4.15	   -­‐16.77	   13.16	   -­‐8.75	   5.68	   -­‐10.95	   4.13	  
2	   -­‐4.25	   6.26	   -­‐15.31	   10.35	   -­‐7.88	   8.62	   -­‐7.43	   8.45	  
3	   -­‐7.23	   9.39	   -­‐9.36	   8.63	   -­‐7.70	   6.33	   -­‐7.60	   7.58	  
4	   -­‐2.77	   3.68	   -­‐21.24	   6.74	   -­‐7.26	   6.67	   -­‐11.73	   1.28	  
5	   0.00	   0.00	   -­‐25.90	   11.72	   -­‐0.83	   4.62	   -­‐9.67	   6.98	  
6	   -­‐2.12	   6.12	   -­‐23.43	   10.71	   -­‐6.45	   4.98	   -­‐4.24	   5.85	  
7	   -­‐4.90	   4.91	   -­‐4.19	   5.17	   -­‐8.85	   6.72	   -­‐10.40	   4.43	  
8	   -­‐0.30	   0.91	   -­‐1.25	   2.48	   -­‐2.04	   5.64	   -­‐7.67	   7.73	  
9	   -­‐11.57	   11.76	   -­‐3.68	   5.20	   -­‐8.91	   6.96	   -­‐7.48	   5.95	  
10	   -­‐10.91	   10.12	   -­‐2.93	   6.84	   -­‐7.44	   6.60	   -­‐9.00	   7.57	  
11	   -­‐0.10	   0.50	   -­‐5.26	   6.35	   -­‐8.64	   7.50	   -­‐9.01	   5.33	  
12	   -­‐11.13	   9.95	   -­‐39.60	   10.82	   -­‐9.56	   5.41	   -­‐10.04	   4.47	  
All	   -­‐4.98	   -­‐	   -­‐14.08	   -­‐	   -­‐7.03	   -­‐	   -­‐8.77	   -­‐	  
 
The income of the participants in the No Punishment Treatment is higher in the NP_PU 
sessions than in the PU_NP sessions (Mann-Whitney U, one-tailed, p = 0.039, Z = -1.790, W 
= 119, U = 41), the same holds for the income in the Punishment Treatment (Mann-Whitney 
U, two-tailed, p = 0.043, Z = -2.021, W = 115, U = 37). 
 
Next, we calculate the ratio between income in the Punishment Treatment per period and the 
income per period in the treatment without punishment for both session types (see Figure 5). 
This ratio is an important indicator for the utility of a punishment mechanism: If the ratio is 
higher than 1, this implies that the punishment mechanism pays, while a value smaller than 1 
hints that punishing is not beneficial at all. The analysis shows that while punishment pays in 
almost all periods of the NP_PU sessions, it never pays in the PU_NP sessions. 
 
In experiments with gains, punishment pays in the last few periods, while it does not pay 
throughout the experiment. This contrasts the results in experiments with losses. Here, 
depending on the sequence of treatments punishment pays or not. 
 
Summary: An experimental comparison of the Public Loss Game clearly shows order effects 
when playing the Punishment before instead of after the No Punishment Treatment. Both 
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In this appendix, we present the experimental instructions and procedures used during our 
experiments. We focus our presentation on the sessions in which we conducted the treatment 
without punishment before the treatments with punishment. We adopted these instructions and 
procedures for the other sequence of treatments accordingly. As instructions and procedures, 
we adapted the corresponding documents described in the “Supporting Online Material”, of 
the paper “Antisocial Punishment Across Societies” by Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al. 
2008). The instructions published were written in English, hence we translated them to 
German for our experiments, and translated them back to English for this appendix. 
1. Experiment Design 
Conducting experiments with losses is slightly different compared to experiments over gains. 
Therefore, after describing our treatments, we introduce the procedure for recruiting the 
participants of our sessions with a focus on differences to standard experiments over gains, 
before we describe the experimental procedure. 
1.1. Treatments 
We conducted two treatments with all participants of our experiments. In the Treatment No 
Punishment (NP) participants played a Public Good Game for 10 periods in groups of 4 
participants. The parameterization of the experiment followed Fehr and Gächter [3] which has 
been used in several subsequent studies (see e.g., [14]). Namely, participants received an 
endowment of 20 tokens to distribute. Every token kept for oneself resulted in a payoff of 1 
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), while a token contributed to the public good yielded 0.4 
ECU per group member. In contrast to Fehr and Gächter all participants received a period loss 
of 32 ECU (the payoff each participant earned if all group members showed full cooperation) 
in the beginning of each period. The Treatment Punishment (PU) was identical to the 
Treatment No Punishment except that we added a punishment stage after the participants 
made their decisions. During the punishment stage participants first saw the contributions of 
their group members in random order and could decide whether to punish a participant or not. 
Participants could punish each group member with 0 to 10 deduction points, costing 
themselves 1 ECU per deduction point and the punished group member 3 ECU per deduction 
point. In the end of the experiment, we transferred the payoff in ECU to a payoff in € by 
multiplying it with 0.025. 
1.2. Conduction of Sessions 
We recruited our participants using ORSEE [10] from various disciplines at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology. Within the invitation, we informed the participants that they had to 
come to the final experiment and to an additional appointed time for receiving instructions at 
least two weeks before the experiment. During the additional appointment, we paid the 
participants their show up fee without giving any further information concerning the 
experiment. 




We conducted all experiments at the networked laboratories of the Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology. In this laboratory all participants are separated to ensure anonymity. The software 
used throughout the experiments was zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
To minimize the impact of the experimenter, we conducted all sessions with the same team of 
two student assistants. Both student assistants did not have knowledge of the literature on 
public goods before the end of the last session, nor did we discuss our expectations concerning 
the experiment with them. To further standardize the procedure, the student assistants resorted 
to written guidelines when conducting the experiment.  
 
In each out of 6 sessions, 16 participants (4 groups) took part. In sum 96 participants attended 
one of our sessions. To ensure that enough participants arrived at the final experiment, we 
recruited some additional participants. The loss in participants corresponds to the average 
fraction of participants we lose per experiment of this size in Karlsruhe. All participants who 
received their show up fee during the instructions, but did not attend the session returned the 
show up fee to the experimenter during the days after the session. With participants who 
attended the session, but could not participate in the experiment, we conducted a lottery during 
which they could lose part of their show up fee. This lottery will not be evaluated in the 
remainder of this paper. 
 
After the experiment ended, the participants paid their lost money to the experimenter. We 
gave participants who had no money with them an additional date for payback, if they had not 
enough money with them. The slowest participant to pay his money returned it four days after 
the session, the majority of participants returned it the same or the following day.  
2. Experimental Procedure 
In the beginning of each session, we randomly assigned participants to seats in the laboratory. 
Afterwards, participants read the instructions and answered several control questions to ensure 
that they understood the experiment. After the control questions we summarized the 
instructions making them common knowledge among all participants. Then the participants 
played the first treatment. After the first treatment, we conducted a second treatment 
introduced by additional instructions and control questions. After the second treatment, 
participants answered a short questionnaire concerning their perception of the game, before we 
paid all participants in private.  
 
Between the sessions, we varied the sequence of treatments. Namely, we played 3 sessions 
with Treatment Punishment following Treatment No Punishment (Session Type NP_PU), 
while we changed the order for 3 other experiments (Session Type PU_NP) (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Number of sessions, groups and participants per session type 
 Sessions Groups Participants 
No Punishment, Punishment (NP_PU) 3 12 48 
Punishment, No Punishment (PU_NP) 3 12 48 
Sum 6 24 96 
 




Two weeks before each session all participants received a show up fee of 13.00 €. This show 
up fee consisted of the default show up fee in Karlsruhe of 5.00 € plus additional 8.00 €. 
Given all participants showed full cooperation during all periods each participant would 
receive exactly 8.00 € for participation. In this way we ensured that all participants of one 
group could reach a payoff during the treatments of 0.00 € for full cooperation, while at least 
one participant received a loss when deviating. In addition all participants received 0.625 € (25 
ECU) in the beginning of each punishment treatment. These payoff rules have another 
advantage: As we used the same transfer rate between ECU and € as Herrmann et al. did 
(Herrmann et al., 2008) in experiments in Germany, a group showing the same behavior in our 
experiments as in the experiments of Herrmann et al. received the same gains and losses for 
contributions and punishment in our experiments as in their experiments. The average payoff 
per participant including the show up fee was 9.53 € (NP_PU Sessions: 10.70 €; PU_NP 
Sessions: 7.96 €) with a minimum of -1.30 € (NP_PU Sessions: 7.70 €; PU_NP Sessions: -
1.30 €) and a maximum of 13.70 € (NP_PU Sessions: 13.70 €; PU_NP Sessions: 12.70 €) 
respectively. On average the experiments lasted 1:23 hours (instructions + control questions: 
49 minutes, treatments: 34 minutes). 
 
The remainder of this section presents the protocol the student assistants followed when 
conducting the experiment. 
2.1. Preparation of the experiment 
• Before the experiment start up all computers in the laboratory (zLeafs) and the server 
(zTree)  
• Distribute instructions with the back of the instructions facing up 
• Prepare cards with computer numbers in the lab, so that participants can be randomly 
allocated to computers. 
2.2. Welcoming outside the lab 
• “Hello, we are glad that you participate in our experiment. You will learn in the lab 
what the experiment is about.” 
• “You are randomly assigned to seats in the lab. Please draw a number and take a seat 
on the corresponding place in the lab.“ 
 
We conducted all experiments with 16 participants per session. Therefore, we invited and paid 
off additional participants to ensure that every session consisted of at least 16 participants. If 
more than 16 participants showed up, we let only the first 16 participants draw a number. With 
all remaining participants, we played another decision experiment. We chose this procedure, 
instead of asking participants whether they wanted to leave voluntarily as we deem it to result 
in more “random” subject groups. 
2.3. Introduction in the lab 
• “Thank you for coming. You will learn from the instructions we have distributed to 
your computer place what the experiment is about. Before we start the experiment, we 
want to point out that communication is not allowed throughout the experiment.” 
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• “At the end of the instructions, you will find control questions. Answering these 
questions is no exam. The questions are meant to ensure that you understood how the 
earnings of the experiment are calculated. Please start reading the instructions.” 
2.4. After answering the control questions of the No Punishment Treatment 
• “All participants have answered the control questions correctly. Before we start with 
the experiment, we summarize it.” 
• “As you know, you interact in this experiment with three other group members. The 
experiment lasts for 10 periods. During all periods you are in the same group. Every 
period, you have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a 
project and how many you want to keep for yourself. Please be aware that you cannot 
transfer any tokens to the next period. In each period you start with an endowment of 
20 tokens. You make your decision about the contribution to the project by entering 
the amount of your contribution in the input dialog.” 
• “When all four group members have made their decisions, a result screen will appear. 
The result screen lists your contribution to the project, the total sum of contributions of 
all four group members to the project, your earnings from retained tokens and your 
income from the income.” 
• “The income of retained tokens is the difference between 20 and your contribution to 
the project. Your income from the project is calculated as 0.4 times the total sum of the 
contributions of all four group members to the project.” 
• “After the result screen was shown, the so called information screen will appear. On 
this screen, you will find a table. In the first column your contribution to the project 
(absolute and in %) is listed. In the other columns the contributions of all other group 
members are listed in a randomly chosen order.” 
• “Do you have any questions?” 
2.5. Conduction of the No Punishment Treatment 
Participants take their decisions undisturbed and unobserved by the experimenters, who only 
observe the experiment by monitoring the software. 
2.6. After Conduction of the No Punishment Treatment 
• “The experiment is now finished. Another experiment follows that lasts 10 periods as 
well. After this, the entire experiment is finished. You will then have to answer a short 
questionnaire and will then get paid.” 
• “We will now distribute the instructions for the next 10 periods.” 
2.7. After answering the control questions of the Punishment Treatment 
• “The second experiment differs from the previous experiment. We have introduced a 
second stage. Please see Fig. 4 of the instructions. There you find the input dialog of 
the second stage. This dialog is similar to the information dialog, you know from the 
first experiment.” 
• “New in this two-stage experiment is the possibility for you to assign deduction points 
(between 0 and -10) to the other group members. One deduction point costs you 1 ECU 
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and reduces the income of the group member to whom you assign the deduction point 
by 3 ECU.” 
• “If you assign deduction points, you have to put a negative sign in front of the number. 
This two-stage experiment will be repeated 10 times with the same people in the 
group.” 
• “Do you have any questions?” 
2.8. Conduction of the Punishment Treatment 
Participants take their decisions undisturbed and unobserved by the experimenters, who only 
observe the experiment by monitoring the software. 
 
2.9. After Conduction of the Punishment Treatment 
• “The second experiment is now finished. Please answer the questions in our 
questionnaire. After this, we will pay you in private.” 
 
After answering the questionnaire all participants are paid in private and the experiment ends. 
3. Translated Experimental Instructions 
In this section we present an English translation of the instructions used throughout our 
experiments. Compared to the instructions in Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al. 2008), we made 
the following changes: 
• The first four sections until the start of the description of the experiment were changed 
according to the first sections typically used in experiments conducted at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology.  
• We replaced the term “guilder” in the original by “ECU” to resemble the wording 
typically used at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. 
• We corrected three typos in the original instructions. There, some examples describing 
the conversion of tokens to guilders, or ECU, in error specified tokens as unit of the 
result instead of the experimental currency.  
• We changed the instructions to introduce the period loss. 
Aside these changes, we stuck to the original instructions as close as possible.  
3.1. No Punishment Treatment 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation. You received € 
13.00 for participation in this experiment. These earnings can increase or decrease in the 
following depending on your own decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Please 
read these instructions – which are the same for all – carefully. To ensure that you understand 
the instructions, please answer the control questions after reading the instructions. These 
control questions are displayed at your computer terminal as soon as you confirmed reading 
the instructions there. 
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Please remain calm and switch of your mobile phones. Communication among the participants 
is not allowed. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will than 
come to you and answer your question in private. If you do not follow these Instructions, we 
have to suspend you from the experiment. You then have to return all payments for 
participation. 
 
Your payoff during the experiment depends on your decisions as well as the decisions of other 
participants. Your earnings will be calculated in experimental currency units (ECU) during the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings will be converted to Euro. The 
conversion rate is: 
 
1 experimental currency unit (ECU) = 0.025 Euro 
 
Every period consists of one stage. In the beginning of each period, you receive a loss of -32 
ECU. In addition you receive 20 tokens. In the remainder we call this your endowment. Your 
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens 
you contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of 
your decision are explained in detail below. At the beginning of each period the following 
input dialog for the first stage will appear (see Fig. 1: Input Dialog). 
 
We will account your earnings with you at the end of the experiment. You will be paid in 
private to ensure that no other participant learns your payoff. 
 
Course of the Experiment 
 
The experiment is divided into 10 separate periods. In each period the participants are divided 
into groups of 4. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition 
to groups of 4 will stay the same for the 10 periods of the experiment. In the following pages 
we describe the experiment in detail. 
 
The period number appears in the top left corner of the input dialog. In the upper right corner 
you see how many more seconds remain for your decision. You will have 90 seconds in the 
first two periods and60 seconds in the remaining periods. Your decision must be made within 
the time limit. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 tokens. You have to decide how many tokens you want 
to contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field 
is reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided how many tokens to 
contribute, you have also decided how many tokens to keep for yourself: This is (20 – your 
contribution) token. After entering your contribution you must click the “OK”-Button. Once 
you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decisions the following screen will show you 
the total amount of tokens contributed by all four group members to the project (including 
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your contribution) (see Fig. 2: Result Screen). This screen also shows you how many ECU 
you have earned during the first stage.  
Your income consists of three parts: 
 
(1) The period loss, which you received in the beginning of the period. 
Period Loss = -32 ECU 
 
(2) The tokens, which you kept for yourself (“Income from retained tokens”) with: 
1 token = 1 ECU 
 
(3) The “Income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows: 
Income from the project = 0.4 x total contributions to the project 
 
Your income in ECU of a period is therefore: 
-32 
+ (20- “Ihr Beitrag zum Projekt”) 
+ 0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project 
 
Fig. 1: Input Dialog 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, i.e. each 
group member receives the same income from the project. Assume, for example, that the sum 
of the contributions to the project 60 tokens. In this case each member of the group receives an 
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for additional losses during the experiment. At the end of the subsequent ten periods the whole 
experiment is finished and you receive: 
 
   Your income from the first 10 periods  
+ Your income from the second 10 periods  
    (including the lump-sum payment of 25 ECU)  
= Total sum of ECU 
 
This experiment consists of two stages in each period and altogether there are 10 periods. The 
first stage is identical to the previous experiment. At the first stage you to decide how many 
tokens out of 20 you would like to contribute to a project (and hence you decide with it how 
many tokens you keep for yourself). Your income from the first stage is calculated exactly in 
the same way as in the previous experiment. 
 
For each token you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 ECU. For any token you 
contribute to the project, you and all other group members will earn 0.4 ECU. Therefore, each 
token that another group member contributes to the project will increase your income by 0.4 
ECU. 
 
Differences in the New Experiment 
 
Now there is a second stage introduced that follows the display of the result screen at the end 
of the first stage. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
At the second stage you see how many tokens each of the other group members contributed to 
the project. In addition, in this stage you can decrease the income of each other group member 
by assigning deduction points. Alternatively you can leave the income unchanged. The other 
group members can also decrease your income if they wish to. This is apparent from the input 
screen at the second stage (see Fig. 4: Input Dialog of the Second Stage). 
 
You now have to decide whether, and if so, how many deduction points to assign to each of 
the other three group members. In any case you must enter a number for each of them. If you 
do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you 
want to distribute deduction points, you must put a negative sign in front of the number 
(without spaces between them). 
 
For this decision you have 180 seconds in the first two periods and 120 seconds in the 
remaining periods. You can move from one input field to the other by pressing the tab-key or 
by using the mouse. 
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assigned points. As long as you have not yet clicked the “OK”-button, you can change your 
decision (within the remaining time). To recalculate the costs after a change of your assigned 
points, press the “Calculation”-button again. 
 
If you assign 0 points to a particular group member (i.e., you enter “0”), you will not alter his 
income. If you assign one deduction point to a group member (i.e., you enter “–1”) you will 
decrease the income of this group member by 3 ECU. If you assign a group member 2 
deduction points (i.e., you enter “–2”), you will decrease the income of the group member by 6 
ECU, and so on. Each deduction point that you assign to another group member will reduce 
his or her income by 3 ECU. 
 
Whether or by how much the income at the second stage is decreased in total depends on the 
total of the received deduction points. If somebody, for instance, receives a total of 3 
deduction points (from all other group members in this period), his or her income is decreased 
by 9 ECU. If somebody receives a total of 4 deduction points, his or her income is reduced by 
12 ECU. Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Total Income (in ECU) at the end of the second stage = income of the period 
 
= Income from the first stage (1) 
- 3 x Number of received deduction points 
(2) 
- Costs for distributing deduction points 
  up  to  -­‐32  (=  period  loss) 
 
If your income at the first stage (1) minus three times the received deduction points (2) is less 
than your period loss (= -32), then you only loose the period loss (-32). Please note, that in the 
end of the second stage your income in ECU can be less than the period loss (-32), if the costs 
of your assigned deduction points exceed your income from the first stage minus the income 
reduction by the received deduction points. You can, however, avoid losses larger than the 
period loss (-32) with certainty through your own decisions! 
 
After all participants have made their decision, your income from the period will be displayed 
on the following screen (see Fig. 5: Income Screen at the End of the Second Stage). 
 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view 
your income. If you are finished before the time is up, please click the “Continue”-Button. 
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(2) Every group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to 
the project. All other group members each contribute 20 tokens to the project. What is: 
a. Your income (in ECU): [0] 
b. The income of all other group members (in ECU): [0] 
(3) Every group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose the other three group 
members contribute a total of 30 tokens to the project. What is: 
a. Your income (in ECU), if you contribute 0 tokens to the project: [0] 
b. Your income (in ECU), if you contribute 15 tokens to the project: [-9] 
(4) Every group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose you contribute 8 tokens to 
the project. What is: 
a. Your income (in ECU), if all other group members together contribute a total of 7 
tokens to the project: [-14] 
b. Your income (in ECU), if all other group members together contribute a total of 22 
tokens to the project: [-8] 
4.2. Punishment Treatment 
(5) Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction points to your three other 
group members: -9, -5, 0. What are the total costs (in ECU) of your assigned deduction 
points? [-14] 
(6) Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction points to your three other 
group members: 0, 0, 0. What are the total costs (in ECU) of your assigned deduction 
points? [0] 
(7) By how many ECU will your income from the first stage be changed, if you receive a total 
of 0 deduction points from the other group members? [0] 
(8) By how many ECU will your income from the first stage be changed, if you receive a total 
of 4 deduction points from your group members? [-12] 
(9) What is the height of your income (in ECU), if you receive a total of 15 deduction points 
from you group members, but du not distribute any deduction points your own? [-32] 
5. Original Instructions 
In the remainder of this section, we present the original German instructions as used 
throughout the experiments. We omit the original control questions and procedures. They are 
available upon request. 
5.1. No Punishment Treatment 
Herzlich willkommen zu diesem Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. Sie 
erhielten bereits 13,00 Euro für die Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Diese Auszahlung kann 
sich im Folgenden abhängig von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der 
Mitspieler verringern. Bitte lesen Sie daher diese Anweisungen – die für alle gleich sind – 
sorgfältig durch. Um sicherzugehen, dass Sie die Instruktionen verstanden haben, beantworten 
Sie bitte im Anschluss an das Lesen der Anleitung einige Kontrollfragen. Diese 
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Kontrollfragen werden Ihnen am Computer-Terminal angezeigt, sobald Sie das Lesen der 
Anleitung dort bestätigt haben. 
 
Bitte verhalten Sie sich ruhig und schalten Sie Ihre Mobiltelefone aus. Kommunikation 
zwischen den Teilnehmern ist nicht erlaubt. Wenn Sie eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die 
Hand. Ein Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage unter vier Augen 
beantworten. Leisten Sie diesen Regeln nicht Folge, müssen wir Sie vom Experiment 
ausschließen. Sämtliche Zahlungen für die Teilnahme sind dann von Ihnen zurückzuzahlen. 
 
Ihre Auszahlung während des Experiments hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und den 
Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Die Auszahlung im Experiment wird in Einheiten der 
Experimentwährung (ECU) gemessen. Die ECU, die Sie im Experiment verdienen, werden am 
Ende des Experiments in Euro umgerechnet. Die Umrechnungsvorschrift lautet: 
 
1 Einheit der Experimentwährung (ECU) = 0.025 Euro 
 
Ihre Auszahlung werden wir am Ende des Experiments mit Ihnen abrechnen. Die Auszahlung 
wird im Privaten vorgenommen, so dass keiner der anderen Teilnehmer Ihre Auszahlung 
erfährt.  
 
Ablauf des Experiments 
 
Das Experiment besteht aus 10 getrennten Runden. In jeder Runde werden die Teilnehmer 
4er-Gruppen zugeordnet. Sie sind also in einer Gruppe mit 3 anderen Teilnehmern. Die 
Zuordnung zu 4er-Gruppen ändert sich während der 10 Runden des Experiments nicht. Auf 
den folgenden Seiten wird das Experiment im Detail erläutert. 
 
Jede Runde besteht aus einer Stufe. Zu Beginn jeder Runde erleiden Sie einen Verlust von –32 
ECU. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie 20 Wertmarken. Im Folgenden wird dies als Ihre Ausstattung 
bezeichnet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es zu entscheiden, wie Sie mit Ihrer Ausstattung umgehen. Sie 
müssen entscheiden wie viele der 20 Wertmarken Sie zu einem Projekt beitragen wollen, und 
wie viele sie selbst behalten. Die Konsequenzen Ihrer Entscheidung werden unten im Detail 
erläutert. Zu Beginn jeder Runde sehen Sie die folgende Eingabemaske für die erste Stufe 
(siehe Abb. 1: Eingabemaske). 
 
Die Rundennummer erscheint im oberen linken Eck der Eingabemaske. Im oberen rechten 
Eck sehen Sie wie viele weitere Sekunden Ihnen für Ihre Entscheidung bleiben. Während der 
ersten zwei Runden haben Sie hierfür 90 Sekunden, während der verbleibenden Runden 60 
Sekunden, Zeit. Sie müssen Ihre Entscheidung während dieses Zeitlimits treffen. 
 
Ihre Ausstattung beträgt während jeder Runde 20 Wertmarken. Sie müssen entscheiden, wie 
viele der Wertmarken Sie zum Projekt beitragen wollen indem Sie eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 
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20 in das Eingabefeld tippen. Sie erreichen das Feld indem Sie es mit der Maus anklicken. 
Durch die Entscheidung, wie viele Wertmarken Sie beitragen, entscheiden Sie auch, wie viele 
Wertmarken Sie für sich selbst behalten: Dies ist (20 – Ihr Beitrag) Wertmarken. Nachdem Sie 
Ihren Beitrag eingetragen haben, müssen Sie den „OK“-Button drücken. Sobald Sie dies getan 
haben, kann Ihre Entscheidung nicht mehr geändert werden. 
 
Abb. 1: Eingabemaske 
 
Nachdem alle Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe ihre Entscheidung getroffen haben, wird Ihnen im 
folgenden Dialog die Gesamtsumme der zum Projekt beigetragenen Wertmarken aller vier 
Gruppenmitglieder (einschließlich Ihres Beitrags) angezeigt (siehe Abb. 2: Ergebnisdialog). 
Der Dialog zeigt auch an, wie viele ECU Sie während der ersten Stufe verdient haben. 
 
Ihre Auszahlung besteht aus drei Teilen: 
 
(1) Dem Rundenverlust, den Sie zu Beginn der Runde erleiden. 
Rundenverlust = – 32 ECU 
 
(2) Den Wertmarken, die Sie für sich behalten („Einkommen aus behaltenen Wertmarken“) 
wobei gilt 
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werden. Der Beitrag in der zweiten Spalte, beispielsweise, stammt generell immer von einem 
anderen Gruppenmitglied. Dasselbe gilt für die Beiträge in den übrigen Spalten. Neben den 
absoluten Beiträgen werden die Beiträge als Anteil der Ausstattung gezeigt. 
 
Während der ersten zwei Runden haben Sie 45 Sekunden und in den verbleibenden Runden 30 
Sekunden Zeit, um diese Informationen zu betrachten. Sind Sie damit vor Ablaufen der Zeit 
fertig, klicken Sie bitte auf den „Weiter“-Button. 
5.2. Punishment Treatment 
Ablauf des Experiments 
 
Im Folgenden wird das Experiment mit einigen Änderungen wiederholt. Jeder Teilnehmer 
erhält eine pauschale Zahlung von 25 ECU zu Beginn des Experiments. Dieser Betrag kann 
genutzt werden, um zusätzliche Verluste während des Experiments auszugleichen. Am Ende 
der folgenden 10 Runden ist das gesamte Experiment abgeschlossen und Sie erhalten: 
 
   Ihr Einkommen aus den ersten 10 Runden 
+ Ihr Einkommen aus den zweiten 10 Runden  
   (einschließlich der Pauschalzahlung von 25 ECU) 
= Gesamtsumme in ECU 
 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus zwei Stufen in jeder Runde und insgesamt 10 Runden. Die 
erste Stufe ist identisch der Stufe im vorherigen Experiment. In der ersten Stufe entscheiden 
Sie, wie viele von 20 Wertmarken Sie zu einem Projekt beitragen wollen (und damit 
entscheiden Sie, wie viele Wertmarken Sie für sich selbst behalten). Ihr Einkommen aus der 
ersten Stufe wird exakt so ermittelt wie im vorherigen Experiment. 
 
Für jede Wertmarke, die Sie behalten, verdienen Sie 1 ECU. Für jede Wertmarke, die Sie zum 
Projekt beitragen, erhalten Sie und alle Gruppenmitglieder 0,4 ECU. Deshalb erhöht jede 
Wertmarke, die ein Gruppenmitglied zum Projekt beiträgt Ihr Einkommen um 0,4 ECU. 
 
Unterschiede im neuen Experiment 
 
Jetzt wird eine zweite Stufe eingeführt, die auf das Darstellen des Ergebnisdialogs aus der 
ersten Stufe folgt.  
 
Die zweite Stufe 
 
In der zweiten Stufe sehen Sie, wie viele Wertmarken jedes der Gruppenmitglieder zum 
Projekt beigetragen hat. Zusätzlich können Sie in dieser Stufe das Einkommen jedes anderen 
Gruppenmitglieds verringern, indem Sie ihm Abschlagspunkte auferlegen. Alternativ können 
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zwischen der Anzahl von verteilten Abschlagspunkten und den Kosten für das Verteilen von 
Abschlagspunkten: 
 
Kosten für das Verteilen von Abschlagspunkten = Summe der verteilten 
Abschlagspunkte 
 
Jeder verteilte Abschlagspunkt kostet Sie 1 ECU. Verteilen Sie beispielsweis 2 
Abschlagspunkte auf ein Gruppenmitglied, so kostet Sie dies 2 ECU, sollten Sie zusätzlich 9 
Abschlagspunkte auf andere Mitglieder verteilen, so kostet Sie dies 9 ECU. Verteilen Sie 0 
Abschlagspunkte auf das letzte Gruppenmitglied, so entstehen für Sie keine Kosten. In Summe 
hätten Sie 11 Abschlagspunkte verteilt und Ihre gesamten Kosten dafür würden 11 (=2+9+0) 
ECU betragen. 
 
Sie können die Gesamtkosten am Computer ermitteln. Um die Berechnung durchzuführen, 
müssen Sie den Button „Berechnen“ (siehe Abb. 4: Eingabemaske in der zweiten Stufe) 
anklicken. Sie können dies tun, sobald Sie die Abschlagspunkte eingetragen haben. Im Dialog 
sehen Sie die Gesamtkosten für die von Ihnen verteilten Abschlagspunkte. Solange Sie den 
Button „OK“ nicht angeklickt haben, können Sie (innerhalb der verbleibenden Zeit) Ihre 
Entscheidung ändern. Um nach der Änderung die Kosten für die verteilten Abschlagspunkte 
zu ermitteln, klicken Sie erneut auf „Berechnen“. 
 
Verteilen Sie 0 Abschlagspunkte auf ein bestimmtes Gruppenmitglied (d.h. Sie tragen „0“ 
ein), ändert sich sein Einkommen nicht. Verteilen Sie einen Abschlagspunkt auf ein 
Gruppenmitglied (d.h. Sie tragen „-1“ ein), verringern Sie das Einkommen dieses 
Gruppenmitglieds um 3 ECU. Verteilen Sie 2 Abschlagspunkte auf ein Gruppenmitglied (d.h. 
Sie tragen „-2“ ein), verringern Sie das Einkommen des Gruppenmitglieds um 6 ECU, und so 
weiter. Jeder Abschlagspunkt, den Sie an ein Gruppenmitglied verteilen, wird sein oder ihr 
Einkommen um 3 ECU verringern. 
 
Ob und wie sehr das Einkommen in der zweiten Stufe insgesamt verringert wird, hängt von 
der Summe der erhaltenen Abschlagspunkte ab. Erhält, beispielsweise, jemand insgesamt 3 
Abschlagspunkte (von allen Gruppenmitgliedern in dieser Runde), so wird sein oder ihr 
Einkommen um 9 ECU verringert. Erhält jemand insgesamt 4 Abschlagspunkte, wird sein 
oder ihr Einkommen um 12 ECU verringert. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen dieser zwei Stufen 
berechnet sich also wie folgt: 
 
Gesamteinkommen (in ECU) am Ende der zweiten Stufe = Einkommen in der Runde 
 
= Einkommen aus der ersten Stufe (1) 
- 3 x Anzahl der erhaltenen Abschlagspunkte 
(2) 
- Kosten für das Verteilen von 
  maximal -32 (= Rundenverlust) 
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